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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this appeal are as follows:
Glade Parduhn, who was the plaintiff below and is an appellant in this Court. Parduhn
was a partner with Brad Buchi, deceased, in University Texaco from 1979 to 1997 and the
named beneficiary under insurance policy NL00989085 (the "Policy") on the life of Brad
Buchi.
University Texaco, a dissolved Utah partnership, and potential intervenor. University
Texaco sought to intervene following remand and is an appellant in this Court. Brad Buchi
and Glade Parduhn formed University Texaco, and through it they owned and operated two
service stations.
Natalie Buchi Bennett, appellee, was the original defendant in this case. Her siblings,
Alison Buchi, Annabelle Buchi, Lance Buchi and Jessica Buchi (sometimes collectively with
Natalie the "Buchi Children"), subsequently joined the action as defendants and
counterclaimants, and are also appellees in this Court. The Buchi Children claimed an
interest in the proceeds of the Policy under a Buy Sell Agreement between Parduhn and
Buchi. All are the children of Brad Buchi, deceased, and Lissa Buchi, his ex-wife. At the
time this suit was filed, all but two had reached the age of majority.
JoAnne Buchi, appellee, joined the suit as a counterclaimant when the Buchi Children
other than Natalie joined. Joanne Buchi married Brad Buchi in 1992, and was married to
him at the time of his death, although they were separated and she had sued for divorce.
Joanne appears in this case in her individual capacity and as executor of Brad Buchi's estate.
1

She also claims an interest individually in the Policy proceeds.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal filed by University Texaco raises two legal issues:
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in denying University Texaco's Motion
to Intervene? This is a legal question subject to the discretion of the trial court; the
appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Utah State Department ofSocial
Services v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 887 (Utah 1996) (stating appropriate standard of review in
a case involving permissive intervention).
2. Did the trial court err in not awarding the Policy Proceeds to University Texaco
on equitable grounds? This is a mixed question of law and fact. In cases of equity, this
Court may exercise a broad scope of review encompassing both questions of law and
questions of fact, and will reverse on the facts when the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings of the trial court, or where the trial court has based its rulings upon a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, §9; Reed v.
Alvey, 610 R2d 1374, 1377; (Utah 1980); Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah
1981). The Court gives no deference to the legal findings of the trial court. Parduhn v.
Bennett, 61 P.3d 984 (Utah 2002).
2

RECORD CITATIONS OF ISSUE RAISED BELOW
University Texaco raised the issues relating to its motion to intervene in pleadings
and at oral argument before the trial court. See R. 1746-1750; 1883-1888 and Transcript
of hearing on remand, May 9, 2003 ("Hr'g Tr.") at 2-13.
University Texaco raised the issues relating to its claim on the merits in pleadings
and at oral argument below. See R. 1724-1735; 1877-1882 and Hr'g Tr. at 14-21 and 4052.

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW
The trial court denied University Texaco's Motion to Intervene. The court based its
ruling on the fact that University Texaco had not intervened prior to trial, and also stated
that Glade Parduhn, the sole surviving partner, adequately represented the interests of the
Partnership, which had no interest in the outcome. This ruling constitutes plain error and an
abuse of discretion, as the court failed to consider all the circumstances of the case as
required on a motion to intervene of right, pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civ. P., and
erroneously applied a likelihood of success on the merits test.
The court also committed reversible error in awarding the Policy proceeds to the
Buchi Heirs. It based its ruling on facts not in evidence; it ignored evidence both in the
record and presented to it in proffers, and it ignored substantial equitable arguments against
the distribution ordered. A ruling without basis in fact or law requires reversal.

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES
OR RULES DETERMINATIVE OF THE OUTCOME
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 (Copy attached at Appendix Tab 1)
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) Intervention ofright. Upon timely applications anyone shall
be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers
an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Background Facts
This case involves a dispute over the disposition of the proceeds of a life insurance
policy, # NL00989085 (the "Policy") on the life of Brad Buchi, deceased. Brad Buchi and
Glade Parduhn, plaintiff and appellant, formed a partnership, University Texaco (sometimes
referred to as the "Partnership"), pursuant to Utah law, in 1979. Through the Partnership,
they owned and operated several service stations. When Parduhn and Buchi formed
University Texaco, Buchi was married to Lissa Buchi. The partners executed a written
partnership agreement and also entered into a "buy-sell" agreement (the "Buy Sell
Agreement"). Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit ("Pltf. Ex.") I.1 They funded the Buy Sell Agreement
The transcript of the trial and the trial exhibits were not included in the record counsel
(continued...)

with insurance policies on each other's life in the amount of $20,000. Id. Initially, the Buy
Sell Agreement provided in relevant part:
Both partners will be insured for $20,000 and all of which will
go to the deceased persons wife or survivors.
Pltf. Ex. 1.
The partners decided to increase the amount of insurance on each other to $100,000
in 1984. They rewrote the Buy Sell Agreement when they purchased the additional
insurance to reflect the increase:
The Buy-Sell insurance will be $100,000. In the event of a
death of either partner, the remaining partner shall pay $ 100,000
to the survivors of the deceased with the proceeds of the
$100,000 insurance policy which each own on each other.
Pltf. Ex. 2.
Five years later, in 1989, the partners again increased the amount of life insurance
coverage on each other when they purchased the Policy and a similar policy on Parduhn's
life. This time they did not amend the Buy Sell Agreement. R. 1449. The Partnership paid
the premiums on both the Policy and the similar policy insuring Parduhn's life. Tr. at 46.
Also in 1989, Buchi took out another policy insuring his life in the amount of
$250,000. That policy named his wife Lissa as primary beneficiary and their children as

1

(...continued)
obtainedfromthe district court, and repeated calls to the clerks office of this Court and the
district courts in Summit and Salt Lake County did not turn up those documents. Therefore,
the references to the transcript and exhibits do not include the record pagination. Copies of
the trial transcript and admitted exhibits obtainedfromcounsel for Parduhn are included in
the Appendix at Tabs 1 and 2 for the Court's reference.

5

secondary beneficiaries. Pltf. Ex. 5.
In 1992, Brad and Lissa Buchi divorced; also in 1992 Brad Buchi married Joanne
Buchi.2 Tr. at 151. Brad Buchi and Joanne Buchi had no children together. Joanne Buchi
sued for divorce in April 1996. That action was pending when Brad Buchi died. Buchi v.
Buchi, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, CivNo.964901449 DA. Buchi died intestate;
Joanne Buchi has been named the personal representative of his estate. In re Estate of Brad
Buchi, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 973901394; see also testimony of
Joanne Buchi, Tr. at 153.
In July 1997, the partners sold the two service stations owned by University Texaco
to Blackett Oil Co. in an asset sale. Tr. at 31. This dissolved the Partnership. Parduhn v.
Bennett, 61 P.3d 982,984-85 (Utah 2002). Three weeks later, Buchi died. The partners had
not wound up the Partnership's affairs before Buchi died, and in fact the winding up
continues due to the pendency of this lawsuit.
Following Buchi's death, Parduhn, as the named beneficiary on the Policy at issue
here, applied for the Policy proceeds with the insurance company, Northern Life. Northern
Life informed Parduhn that Natalie Buchi Bennett, Brad and Lissa Buchi's oldest daughter,
had also claimed the proceeds. Parduhn filed this case, disputing Natalie Buchi Bennett's
claim to the Policy proceeds.

2

Although Joanne and Brad Buchi were married at the time of his death, Joanne Buchi
had sued for divorce and they were separated; the status of their marriage was an issue on
remand that the court refused to consider. See Point H.C. 1. below. All the Buchi children
are the children of Brad Buchi and Lissa Buchi.

6

Procedural History of the Case
Parduhn originallyfiledthis action against Natalie Buchi Bennett only, as she was the
only person to have made a claim on the Policy proceeds. R. 1-8. Subsequently, Northern
Life interpleaded the Policy proceeds into court pursuant to stipulation by the parties. R. 3335. Following a motion by Parduhn to have Natalie Buchi join all necessary parties, the
remaining Buchi Children and Joanne Buchi, (purportedly in her capacity as personal
representative of the estate of Brad Buchi as well as individually) joined as defendants and
filed an amended answer and counterclaim. Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. 275281.3
The case was originally set for trial before Judge Stirba. In March 2000, Judge Stirba
signed a scheduling order that set August 18,2000 as the cut off date for all motions except
motions in limine. R. at 344. On October 26, 2000, Joanne Buchi filed pleading styled a
"Motion in Limine" seeking to have the court declare that Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104(5)
applied to bar plaintiff Glade Parduhnfromreceiving any of the Policy proceeds. R. 1093
at 1094 (Motion) and R. 1096 at 1098 (Memorandum in Support of Motion).
Following Judge Stirba's death, the case was transferred to Judge Lubeck, who held
a bench trial in August 2001 and issuedfindingsin a Memorandum Decision. R. 1448-145 8.
The trial court found that the sale of its major assets dissolved the Partnership. R. 1451. He
also held that the Buy Sell Agreement survived the sale of the service stations and governed
3

Brad Buchi's ex-wife, Lissa, to whom he had been married when he took out the
Policy, disclaimed any interest in the Policy for herself or her minor children. R. 3 81-3 82.
7

disposition of the Policy proceeds. Id. The court also found that the Partnership paid the
premiums on the Policy. R. 1452. The existence of the Buy Sell Agreement made
ambiguous the policy's beneficiary designation of Glade Parduhn. R. 1454. The court
therefore held that although the Policy named Parduhn as the beneficiary, the Buy Sell
Agreement required the court to award the Policy proceeds to Joanne Buchi and the Buchi
Children. R. 1458. Glade Parduhn appealed the decision to this Court.4
This Court issued its ruling on appeal on September 6, 2002. It found that the sale
of the partnership's major assets caused the dissolution of the partnership. Parduhn V.
Bennett, 61 P.3d 982, 984-85, fl8. It reversed both the holding that the Buy Sell Agreement
survived that event, and the holding that the Buy Sell Agreement made the beneficiary
designation ambiguous. Id. at 984, J7 and 986, f 15. The Buchi heirs were not entitled to
the Proceeds, the Court ruled, because the Buy Sell Agreement was no longer effective. In
a matter of first impression, however, the Court also ruled that the dissolution of the
Partnership ended Parduhn's insurable interest in Buchi1 s life pursuant to 31A-21-104 (l)(b)
and (2)(a). Id at 986, ^[16. Given these rulings, the Court did not award the Proceeds to any
of the claimants. Instead, itremandedthe case to the trial court with instructions to distribute

4

In connection with his appeal, Parduhn sought a stay of execution in this Court. Prior
to the time that stay was entered, the trial court had paid the proceeds to the defendants. This
Court ordered the defendants to pay back into court all funds they still had in their
possession. Although the Buchi Children repaid most of the funds they had received, Joanne
Buchi had used her portion of the funds to pay off the mortgage on her house and did not
return any of the proceeds she had received. See accountingfiledby Joanne Buchi, R. 17181719.
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the proceeds pursuant to §31A-21-104(5) to "some person who is equitably entitled to
them." Utah Code Ann. §31A-104(5).
After noting that the word "person" includes a partnership, the Court stated,
"[p]roperty acquired with partnership funds are [sic] presumed to be assets of the
partnership, including insurance on the life of a partner" and concluded that "in the event the
insurance policy is an asset of the partnership, the proceeds would be divided... pursuant
to the partnership agreement regarding asset division at winding up." (Id at 987, ^f 17 n.3.)
The Court then noted that" the trial court found that the intent of the partners was to keep
the cost equal for the partnership and that the partnership in fact paid the premiums." Id
Following remand, the Buchi Heirs filed a pleading styled "Amended Order and
Judgment on Remand," but filed no motion with it. R. 1890-1893. Upon the objection of
Parduhn, the court ordered the "Amended Order" be treated as a motion, and ordered
responses to be filed within ten days. R. 1649. Within the time set by the court for
responses to the "Amended Order," the Partnership moved to intervene of right pursuant to
Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civ. P. R. 1746-1750. At the same time, it filed an objection to the
"Amended Order" and a motion for an order awarding the proceeds of insurance policy to
the Partnership. R. 1724-1745. The Buchi Children and Joanne Buchi argued the timeliness
of University Texaco's motion to intervene, but did not challenge University Texaco's right
ot intervene on other grounds.5

5

The Buchi Heirs argued that the motion was barred by the scheduling order entered
(continued...)

9

The trial court heard oral argument from University Texaco, Parduhn, the Buchi
Children and Joanne Buchi on both the motion to intervene and the ultimate disposition of
the Policy proceeds. Some of the argument presented included reference to facts not in
evidence before the court.6 The court declined to hold an additional hearing to take new
evidence, however, and purported to rule solely on the evidence provided at trial, without
considering the additional materials provided to it in the pleadings on remand. R. 1902.
In a Memorandum Decision, the court denied University Texaco1 s motion to intervene
as untimely, and again ordered the insurance proceeds paid one-half to Joanne Buchi and
one-half to the Buchi Children. R. 1894-1906 (copy attached). The court held that although
"the buy-sell agreement was no longer effective, as decided by the Supreme Court, it does
provide guidance in deciding Buchi and Parduhn's intent when they obtained the policies
with the intent to provide their respective heirs with immediate funds and to cash out the
surviving partner's interest in the partnership". R. 1902. The court believed that such intent
was "clear" and that Buchi and Parduhn intended the Buchi Heirs to be the "sole
beneficiaries" of the Policy. Id "If they intended the surviving partner to retain any portion

5

(...continued)
by Judge Stirba setting a cut off date for adding new parties, the statue of limitation for
bringing an action on a written insurance policy and by laches. R. at 1770-1774; 1781-1784.
6

Parduhn and University Texaco each argued that the court could not award the
proceeds to the Buchi Heirs without hearing additional evidence. The Buchi Children and
Joanne Buchi each argued that no additional evidence needed to be taken; however, they too,
relied on facts not in evidence in their briefs and during oral argument. See, e.g. Hr'g Tr. at
24-25; see Point H.B. below.
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of the proceeds, the court believes that such a provision could have and would have been
provided to show such intent." Id.
Parduhn and University Texaco filed this appeal following issuance of a final
judgment by the trial court on June 18, 2003. R. 1972-1973.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
University Texaco raises two issues in this Appeal.
First, the trial court should have allowed University Texaco to intervene of right
because (a) its motion was timely, given the Supreme Court's opinion and the unusual
circumstances of this case; (b) it claims an interest in the subject matter of the action; and
(c) its interests were not adequately represented by the existing parties. Rule 24(a),
governing intervention of right, requires only that a potential intervenor make a timely
application, claim an interest in the property or transaction at issue, and be situated such that
disposition may impair or impede the intervenor's ability to protect its interest. Timeliness
is not a mechanical concept, but must be determined from the facts and circumstances of
each case. Jennerv. Real Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1983). Courts must
examine in particular whether substantial justice favors intervention, and whether
intervention will prejudice existing parties. Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 778 S.W.2d 670,
673 (Mo. App. 1989).
Here the circumstances required the court to grant University Texaco's motion to
intervene. This Court had rejected the legal claims of both the Policy beneficiary and the
11

asserted beneficiaries of the Buy Sell Agreement. It remanded the case for the express
purpose of determining, in equity, who was entitled to the proceeds of the Policy on the life
of Brad Buchi. The Court remanded with instructions to consider the Partnership's claim
in equity to the proceeds. None of the existing parties can be prejudiced by University
Texaco's intervention at this point, because this court's remand required the court to re-visit
the issues and hold additional proceedings, whether or not University Texaco intervened.
Because the trial court refused to consider all the circumstances, this court must reverse the
decision below and grant University Texaco's motion to intervene.
Second, the court should have awarded the Policy proceeds to University Texaco in
equity. Of all the claimants, University Texaco was the only one whose claims this Court
had not already rejected. Equity rests in the sound discretion of the court, but where the
court's exercise of discretion has no foundation in the record, this Court must reverse.
Millard County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 823 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1991); Bellon v.
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089,1095 (Utah 1991). Equity required the trial court to deal fairly with
all concerned, and to fashion a remedy based on the evidence before it that would achieve
a proper balance of conflicting interests. The trial court instead ignored the evidence in the
trial record and relied on assertions of counsel wholly unsupported in the trial record. The
trial court committed reversible error in relying on extra judicial facts and in discarding
inconvenient facts to avoid a decision in favor of the Partnership. Thurston v. Box Elder Co.,
892 P.2d 1034, 1995 Utah Lexis 24, * 6-7. (1995).
Equity required an award of the proceeds to University Texaco. Such an award would
12

have allowed the Court to "do equity" in the broadest way possible, by allowing everyone
who had any economic interest in Brad Buchi's life to share in the proceeds.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED UNIVERSITY
TEXACO TO INTERVENE AS OF RIGHT
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of University Texaco's motion to
intervene as untimely. The Court believed that Parduhn, as the sole surviving partner, "had
the duty and discretion to pursue any claims on behalf of University Texaco" and failed to
do so prior to trial. R. 1899. The court erred in making that ruling. Timeliness is not a
mathematical calculation, but depends on all the circumstances presented by each case,
including the posture of the case at the time intervention is sought, whether the party seeking
intervention could have done so earlier, and the relative prejudice to the parties and the
intervenor. Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202,1206 (5th Cir. 1994); Jenner v. Real Estate
Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Utah 1983). The court also wrongly rejected University
Texaco's motion to intervene on its view of the underlying merits.

R. at 1900.

("Furthermore, University Texaco did not have an interest in the proceeds...").
In denying University Texaco's motion to intervene, the trial court failed to consider
any of the circumstances that support allowing the Partnership to intervene. It ignored this
Court's express suggestion on remand that the Partnership was entitled to the proceeds in
equity. It ignored the fact that at the time the Partnership sought to intervene, all the claims
13

advanced at trial had been rejected. It ignored the fact that the parties will suffer no
prejudice from the Partnership joining the case on remand. It ignored the fact that anyone,
including the Buchi Heirs or the court itself, could have joined the Partnership prior to trial,
if they had viewed the Partnership having a potential claim to the proceeds.7
In short, the court committed an abuse of discretion in denying University Texaco's
motion to intervene. University Texacofiledits motion in a timely fashion, and satisfied all
the requirements of Rule 24(a). This Court should reverse the trial court and allow
University Texaco to intervene for the purpose of asserting a claim to the proceeds.
A. Rule 24(a) Required the Trial Court to Look at All the
Circumstances of the Case Before Ruling on University Texaco's
Motion to Intervene.
Rule 24(a) governs intervention as of right. That Rule states in relevant part:
Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so
situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter,
impair or impeded his ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Rule 24(a), U.R. Civ. P. The rule does not define "timely" or give any guidance to the
courts. However, Utah courts as well as other state and federal courts agree that timeliness
is "aflexible concept." Kim v. H.V. Corporation, 688 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Haw. 1984). The
court must look at the prejudice to the parties, the intervenor and whether the intervention

7

The court erroneously stated in its Memorandum Decision following remand that only
Parduhn could have added University Texaco to the case. R. 1899.
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will delay the proceedings. Reeves v ITT, 616 F.2d 1342,1349 (5th Cir. 1980) (in analyzing
timeliness of motion for permissive intervention, "[a]n 'absolute measure of timeliness,'..
. is of little significance in determining the propriety o f the motion"). Cf Jenner v. Real
Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1983) (denying intervention under the facts
before it, but recognizing that timeliness "must be determined under the facts and
circumstances of each particular case and in the sound discretion of the court"); Lima v.
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279,284 (Utah 1982) (allowing insurance company to intervene after
summary judgment on liability). Even post judgment motions may be granted in appropriate
circumstances. Jenner; United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1977)
(unnamed class member allowed to intervene after judgment denying class status).
"The requirement of timeliness is not a tool of retribution to punish the tardy
would-be intervenor, but rather a guard against prejudicing the original parties by the failure
to apply sooner. Federal courts should allow intervention 'where no one would be hurt and
greater justice could be attained.'" Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1205; see also 7c Wright, Miller
& Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1916, at 425-26 (2d ed. 1986) (the
"requirement of timeliness is not a means of punishment for the dilatory and the mere lapse
of time by itself does not make an application untimely" (footnote omitted)).8 In Sierra
Club, the court identified four factors by which to evaluate the timeliness of a motion to

8

Although these cases and authorities all involve the federal rule, F. R. Civ. P. 24(a)
is identical to Utah Rule 24(a) in all material respects. Compare Rule 24(a), F.R. Civ. P.
(copy attached at Appendix Tab 2) and Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a).

15

intervene: (1) the length of time applicants knew or should have known of their interest in
the case; (2) prejudice to existing parties caused by applicants' delay; (3) prejudice to
applicants if their motion is denied; and (4) any unusual circumstances. 18 F.3d at 1205.
It also noted that courts should not encourage premature intervention. Id. at 1206.
Another state court, interpreting a rule essentially identical to Utah's Rule 24(a), held
that the two most important factors are whether substantial justice favors intervention, and
whether intervention will prejudice existing parties. Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 778
S.W.2d 670, 673 (Mo. App. 1989) (noting at page 671 that the Missouri rule is "essentially
the same" as Federal Rule 24(a)). "If the trial court failed to give appropriate consideration
to these factors, then the decision is subject to reversal for an abuse of discretion." Id. The
court here never examined these factors.
The court also rejected University Texaco's motion based on the second requirement
of Rule 24(a), when it found that University Texaco had "no interest" in the matter because
the court was going to award the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs. Courts should look to
pleadings to determine interest, however, not the likelihood of the intervenor prevailing.
College Parkv. Jenkins, 819 A.2d. 1129, 1135 (Md. 2003).
The trial court here denied the Partnership's motion to intervene without any
substantial reasons for the denial. A court's denial of a motion to intervene is not
unreviewable simply because the court has broad discretion; the denial must be based on
substance, or it will be overturned. Millard County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 823 P.2d
459, 462 (Utah 1991) (reversing tax commission's denial of statutory
16

motion for

intervention). As shown below, the record demonstrates that the court abused its discretion
in denying the Partnership's motion to intervene without substantial reason.
B. The Court Should Have Allowed University Texaco to
Intervene, as it Met All Requirements of Rule 24(a).
The district court erred in rejecting University Texaco's motion to intervene without
considering the particular circumstances of this case when it filed its motion or the prejudice
to the parties. Millard County, 823 P.2d at 462; College Park, 819 A.2d at 1135; Kim, 688
P.2d at 1161; Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1205; Long v. City of Hoover, 844 So. 2d 1273,1282
(Ala. 2002).
The trial court primarily rejected the Partnership's motion to intervene because it felt
that the Partnership could and should have intervened at an earlier stage of these
proceedings. The court faulted Parduhn for not having joined the Partnership earlier,
surmising that Parduhn did notjoin the partnership because he "wanted the proceeds in full."
R. 1899-1900. In fact, if the Partnership should have been joined prior to trial, the
responsibility for joinder more properly fell to Natalie Buchi Bennett. First, early in the
history of this suit Parduhnfileda motion to force Natalie Buchi to join all necessary parties.
(See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Counterclaimant to Join Necessary
Parties of Dismiss Counterclaim, R. at 253-265.) In response, the rest of the Buchi children
and Joanne Buchi joined with Natalie as counterclaimants. R. 275-281. None of them
sought to have the Partnership join.
Second, it was the Joanne Buchi, not Parduhn, who albeit belatedly raised the issue
17

of Utah Code Ann. §31 A-104(5) to argue that Parduhn should not receive the proceeds. She
did not suggest that the statute might give the Partnership (or anyone other than the Buchi
Heirs, for that matter) a right to the proceeds. R. 1096-1102. Nor did she put on evidence
of who might be entitled to the proceeds under that section. She did not argue that anyone
other than herself and the Buchi Children had arightto the proceeds under any principle of
law.
Moreover, the Buchi Heirs had a greater interest than Parduhn in not joining the
Partnership. An award to the Partnership would not only mean splitting the proceeds with
Parduhn, but also it would require the proceeds to pass through the Buchi estate, giving
creditors of the estate a portion of the proceeds as well. This the Buchi Heirs have
consistently argued against. See Point H.C.2. below.
In any event, the issues at trial relating to the Policy proceeds involved two narrowly
drawn legal claims to the Policy proceeds. Parduhn asserted that the Policy, which named
him beneficiary, entitled him to the proceeds, while the Buchi Heirs claimed that the Buy
Sell Agreement entitled them to the proceeds. No one asserted a claim based in equity. The
Court did not take evidence on anyone's equitablerightsto the proceeds. The only time the
subject came up was in argument. See Tr. at 93; 202-203. Yet, even then, counsel for the
Buchi Heirs argued only that under the statue the Buchi Heirs should get the entire proceeds
because they were related to Buchi. Id.
The Partnership was not named as a beneficiary of either the Policy or the Buy Sell
Agreement, and never had any basis in law to claim the Policy Proceeds. Until this Court's
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ruling on appeal, no one had any reason to analyze whether someone other than the named
Policy beneficiary or the beneficiaries of the Buy Sell Agreement might be entitled to the
proceeds. For the Partnership to have intervened prior to trial would have required the
Partnership to anticipate this Court's holding on appeal. The law does not require potential
litigants to anticipate all possible claims and outcomes. See, e.g. Frost, 778 S.W.2d at 67374 (refusing to uphold denial of motion to intervene even though intervenor knew of the
pendency of the case, but waited until after trial to intervene).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Partnership could have successfully intervened
prior to trial, the other factors the court failed to consider mandated allowing intervention
following remand. This case does not involve an intervenor attempting to set aside or change
a judgment that has become final. University Texaco did not sit on the sidelines waiting to
see what the outcome would be and then seeking to alter the outcome. Instead, the Supreme
Court itself invited the intervention and changed the posture of the case, through its reversal
of the trial court and its holding that none of the parties had a legal right to the proceeds.
The remand required the district court to start over and award the proceeds to a different
party on a different basis form that originally considered by the court. By its comments in
footnote 3, the Court invited the trial court to open the universe of potential claimants
beyond those already before the court, particularly University Texaco. 61 P.3d at 987,
f 17n.39 As a result, University Texaco's intervention does not involve the same concerns

9

At the hearing following remand, the Buchi Heirs suggested that perhaps Blackett Oil
(continued...)
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that would ordinarily confront a court faced with a post judgment motion to intervene.
Moreover, neither the Buchi Heirs nor Parduhn showed any prejudicefromallowing
University Texaco to intervene at this time. The Buchi Children baldly asserted that "the
rights of existing parties would be highly prejudiced because additional discovery, delay and
costs would certainly result from intervention by University Texaco." R. 1784. Joanne
Buchi claimed that to allow University Texaco to intervene would "delay... distribution of
the proceeds of the life insurance..." R. 1774. Beyond their mere allegations, however, the
Buchi Heirs could not demonstrate actual or potential prejudice.
Given the posture of this case, no prejudice could have resulted to the partiesfromthe
intervention of the Partnership. First, the court had already scheduled briefing and
determined to hold an argument on the issue on remand. R. 1649. University Texaco filed
its briefs within the time allotted by the court. R. 1724-1750. Second, as the Partnership
argued below, the trial court could have ordered the proceeds distributed to the Partnership
without taking new evidence or incurring additional delay beyond that caused by the Court's
remand. Even without University Texaco in the case, the Court's order of remand made
clear that the trial court would have to consider equitable issues that the parties had not

9

(...continued)
would be entitled to the proceeds. If the asset purchase agreement between University
Texaco and Blackett Oil (which was never introduced into evidence) purported to sell
Blackett Oil assets such as the Policy, that suggestion would not have been far fetched. In
fact, however, Blackett Oil purchased only the realty and limited associated personal
property. The Buchi Heirs' suggestion, without factual basis, appears to havefiguredheavily
into the court's holding, however. See Point II below.
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raised at trial. If in fact the court needed to hear new evidence, that need arose from this
Court's reversal and remand instructions, not the intervention of University Texaco.10
In any event, the Buchi Heirs misconstrue "prejudice." "The prejudice prong of the
timeliness inquiry 'measures prejudice caused by the intervenors' delay - not by the
intervention itself." Utah Association ofCounties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246,1251 (10th Cir.
2001), quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 828 (5th Cir. 1998). Obviously, the Buchi
Heirs would have preferred that the trial court simply award them the proceeds without any
fiirther hearing, and anything to prevent that would cause them to "suffer." But that
sufferance does not constitute "prejudice" and it does notresultfromthe timing ofUniversity
Texaco's motion; it merely resultsfromthe proper application of the law.
Neither the Buchi Heirs nor Parduhn will suffer prejudice if University Texaco is
allowed to intervene. University Texaco filed its motion to intervene in a timely manner
after remand, within the time set by the trial court for motions on the issue remanded. No
proceedings in furtherance of the remand had yet occurred when University sought
intervention. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court and allow University
Texaco to intervene for the purpose of asserting its right, in equity, to the proceeds of the
Policy. Utah Assoc, of Counties, 255 F.3d atl251. u

10

In their briefs and in oral argument, University Texaco and Parduhn made several
proffers of the evidence that the court should hear before making any decision to award the
proceeds to the Buchi Heirs in equity. See Point II below.
11

If the Court for any reason affirms the denial of University Texaco's Motion to
(continued...)
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POINT H.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED THE
POLICY PROCEEDS TO THE PARTNERSHIP IN EQUITY
Merriam Webster's On-Line dictionary defines "equity" as "justice according to
natural law or right; specifically: freedom from bias or favoritism." Equitable means
"dealing fairly and equally with all concerned."

Merriam-Webster Online,

http://www.merriamwebster.com/.
This Court remanded this case to the district court with instructions to determine the
person to whom it should award the proceeds in equity. Instead, the lower court used a chain
of unsupported inferences to run roughshod over the concepts of justice, fairness and
impartiality. It awarded the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs without a shred of factual, equitable
or legal basis for its decision. In doing so, it ignored the evidence in the record and proffers
of additional facts that supported an award to the Partnership and contradicted the award to
the Buchi Heirs.
Equity may rest in the discretion of the court, but that discretion must have some
foundation in the record. Millard County,*!! P.2d ntA62\Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089,
1095 (Utah 1991). Here, no such foundation exists. The court instead based its decision
solely on the unsubstantiated arguments made by counsel for the Buchi Children and the
Buchi Heirs. This Court cannot allow the ruling to stand.

11

(...continued)
Intervene, the Court should treat this Memorandum as an amicus curiae brief and still hear
arguments of the Partnership.
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In Bellon, the Court recited the standard language of review, saying it would not set
aside a trial court'sfindingsof fact in a case at equity or law "unless clearly erroneous." 808
P.2d at 1094. However, said the Court, where the appellate court has "a definite and firm
conviction" that the trial court has made a mistake of fact, it must reverse on that basis. Id.
at 1095, quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). No greater mistake of fact
can be made than basing a decision entirely on facts outside the record. As shown below,
the trial court did just that. This Court must reverse the decision of the court as contrary to
the facts and law.
A. The Court's Ruling in Favor of the Buchi Heirs Has No
Support In the Record.
University Texaco and Parduhn specifically asked the court to take new evidence.
The court allowed counsel to include in argument various points of fact not introduced into
evidence in the trial. Nonetheless, the court expressly declined to hold a hearing or second
trial to consider new evidence, stating:
The court believes that [evidence received at trial] is the best
evidence as to the intent and conduct of the parties, rather than
now entertaining someone's opinion and rather than now
hearing/acte tailored to the issue before the court
R. 1902 (emphasis added).
In the pages of its Memorandum Decision the court devoted to explaining why it
would not award the proceeds to University Texaco, however, not one ofthe "facts" relied
on by the court exists in the trial record.
Although the remand instructions did not direct the district court to take additional
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evidence, certainly this Court could not have intended the trial court to enter an order
supported only by assumptions, suppositions or naked assertions made by counsel in
argument. Where instructions on remand are not specific about subsequent proceedings, the
trial court "has discretion to deal with those issues as it sees fit, including allowing
supplementalfilingsor proceedings." 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 973 P.2d
992 (Utah Ct App. 1999), quoting Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995). Where a court chooses not to take new evidence on remand, it cannot simply
find a fact to be true because it wants the fact to be true, or because the record contains no
evidence to the contrary. Thus, in 4447 Associates, the court rejected as unsupported a
defense the defendant attempted to raise for the first time following remand. The new
defense required evidence that the defendant acted in good faith and in a commercially
reasonable manner. The defendant presented no new evidence, arguing that the absence of
evidence of bad faith or unreasonableness in the record established the defense. 973 P.2d
at 997,1(17. The court rejected that argument, holding that the record contained insufficient
evidence to establish the defense. Id., |18.
In this case, of course, the new issue was raised by the Supreme Court, not by one of
the parties. However, that distinction did not give the district court the luxury of filling
evidentiary holes with its own suppositions to find in favor of the Buchi Heirs, wholly
unsupported by the record. On remand, it was incumbent on the judge to ensure that the
record contained sufficient facts on which to base the decision, or order the taking of
additional evidence. See In the Matter ofthe Adoption of W.A. T., 808P.2d 1083 (Utah 1991)
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(reversing dismissal of petition to adopt and remanding because the district court did not
afford the petitioners a "comprehensive evaluation hearing").
Although the trial court stated it would not take additional evidence, it in fact based
its distribution of the Policy proceeds to the Buchi Heirs instead of the Partnership on
assertions of fact raised only in the argument of counsel. First, the court "found" that the
sale to Blackett Oil in July 1997 involved all or substantially all the assets of the Partnership,
and since Blackett Oil did not purchase the Policy, it could not have been a Partnership asset.
R. 1902. Second, the Court claimed that other "evidence" produced at trial contradicted the
evidence that the Partnership paid the Policy premiums.
The trial court is wrong. These two "factual" prongs for the court's decision have
absolutely no support in the record.12 This Court cannot allow such an unsupported ruling
to stand.
In oral argument on remand, counsel for the Buchi children raised for the first time
an argument that had the Policy truly been an asset of the partnership, it would have, or
should have, been sold to Blackett Oil. Transcript of Hearing, May 9,2003 (copy attached
at Appendix Tab 5) ("Hr'g. Tr.") at 23. Apparently the court found this argument persuasive,

12

Of course, it is impossible to cite to an absence of a fact, so no particular pages of the
trial transcript are here cited. However, if any testimony existed about the way the
Partnership paid its bills, or the terms of the sale to Blackett Oil, it would most likely appear
in the testimony of Glade Parduhn (Tr. at 16 to 58 and 153 to 154), or Lany Johnson (the
Partnership's accountant) (Tr. 59 to 66). Counsel invites the Court to review those sections,
and in fact the entire trial transcript, which consists of only 157 pages, excluding closing
argument.
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as it stated "that factor alone" indicated that the Policy did not belong to the Partnership. R.
1902. The record, however, simply does not support a conclusion that the Policy was or
should have been sold to Blackett Oil. The only testimony about the sale inferred that the
stations, as opposed to all the assets, were sold:
20
Q. What was the fate of the service stations on that
21 date? What happened to them?
22
A. They were sold.
23
Q. To whom?
24
A. Blackett Oil Company.
Tr. at 31 (Glade Parduhn testifying, emphasis added).
20
Q. And then on July 14th the service stations were sold
21 to Blackett Oil Company, correct?
22
A. Yes.
Tr. at 34 (Glade Parduhn testifying, emphasis added)
18
Q. Now, are you aware that the stations were sold to
19 Blackett Oil Company on July 14th, 1997?
20
A. Yes.
* * *

5
Q. Since the sale of stations, what type — and I am not
6 asking about - but what type of income has been earned by
the
7 partnership since the stations were sold?
8
A. Interest.
Tr. at 62-63 (Larry Johnson testifying, emphasis added).
Such limited testimony does not support the court's conclusion. Had the court felt
that the claims made by counsel raised a relevant factual issue, it should have taken
additional evidence. Had it done so, it would have learned that the Partnership sold only
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very specific assets to Blackett Oil.

Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law filed by Parduhn, and Exhibit A thereto at R. 1932 and R. 1939-1946.13
The rest of the "evidence" on which the court relied to deny the Partnership the
proceeds similarly lacks a factual foundation in the record. The court stated that "the
partners treated the partnership rather casually, basically taking what they needed in many
instances." R. 1902-03. It referred to "evidence at trial that partnership proceeds were used
to pay for various things that were not considered partnership assets." R. 1903. A search
of the entire trial transcript and exhibits reveals no such evidence, nor anything that could
be construed to support such a conclusion, even with great liberties of language.14 The only
place such assertions exist are in the memorandafieldby the Buchi Heirs following remand
and counsel's argument to the court. Hr'g. Tr. at 24-25,36. After making his argument, Mr.
Tanner assured the court that the record included the "facts" he was citing, saying
"Absolutely. Absolutely it does."15

13

Upon being shown the falsity of its assumption about the sale, the court withdrew the
statement. R. 1972-73. It did not change the conclusion it drewfromthat erroneous fact,
however.
14

Counsel for Joanne Buchi did ask Parduhn about expenditures of Partnership funds
after the sale to Blackett Oil. Neither those questions nor Parduhn's answers to them directly
or indirectly support a conclusion that the Partnership so commingled funds that its payment
of the premiums should be ignored. Tr. 57 (Glade Parduhn testimony). Nor did counsel
attempt to draw such an inference from the answers. See Tr. 188 (argument of Counsel for
Buchi Children).
15

In so assuring the court, Mr. Tanner cited to the memorandumfiledby Joanne Buchi.
Hr'g. Tr. at 25. However, that memorandum clearly admitted that the "facts" it recited on
(continued...)
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Argument of counsel and exhibits to memoranda do not substitute for evidence
admitted under appropriate evidentiary safeguards. Because the court declined to hear
additional evidence, it could only look to the evidence admitted at trial in fashioning an
equitable distribtuion. Not only did that evidence show that the Partnership paid the
premiums on the Policy, therefore presumptively making the Policy an asset of the
Partnership, but no other claimant produced evidence of a stronger equitable right to the
proceeds of the Policy to overcome that presumption. The trial court committed reversible
error in relying on extrajudicial facts and in discarding inconvenient facts to avoid a decision
in favor of the Partnership. Thurston v. Box Elder Co., 892 P.2d 1034,1995 Utah Lexis 24,
* 6-7. (1995). This court should reverse the decision of the court below and enter judgment
in favor of the Partnership based on the record evidence.16
B. The Evidence Supports an Award of the Policy Proceeds to the
Partnership.
In footnote 3 of its opinion in thefirstappeal, this Court noted that the word "person"
as used in Utah Code Annotated §31A-21-104(5) includes ^partnership. 61 P.3d at 987 n.3,
1fl7. The Court then stated that "[p]roperty acquired with partnership funds are [sic]
presumed to be assets of the partnership" and concluded that "in the event the insurance

15

(...continued)
this point were not before the court. R. 1858.
16

As shown below, the evidence would allow this Court to reverse and enter judgment
in favor of University Texaco. At the very least, however, the Court should reverse and
remand again with specific instructions to the court to hold an additional evidentiary hearing
to determine who is equitably entitled to the proceeds.
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policy is an asset of the partnership, the proceeds would be divided . . . pursuant to the
partnership agreement regarding asset division at winding up. Id.
At the trial in this case, Glade Parduhn testified that the Partnership paid the
premiums on the Policy.

Tr. 46 (Glade Parduhn, cross examination).17 This testimony

remained uncontroverted throughout trial. Based on that testimony, the trial court found that
"the partnership in fact paid the premium." R. 1452. The Supreme Court adopted this
finding on appeal. 61 P.3d at 987 n.3, ^[17) The finding thus became part of the case on
remand. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037 ("'law of the case' is a legal doctrine under which a
decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the
same litigation") citing Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990); see also Waters v.
Jorgenson, 29 P.3d 2, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (finding that second district judge had erred
in entering order that contradicted facts found in earlier order in the case, without taking any
new evidence). A lower court "is bound to follow [instructions from the appellate court],
even though it considers the ruling erroneous." Slattery v. Covey, 909 P.2d 925,928 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995), quoting Streetv. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60,191 P.2d 153,
158 (1948).
When this Court remanded the case to the trial court, it identified several factors the
court should consider in determining whether the Policy should be deemed an asset of the

17

In fact, the other parties had an incentive to put on evidence to the contrary, as such
evidence would have bolstered their contention that they were entitled to the proceeds.
However, in spite of ample opportunity to do so, no one challenged this evidence.
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Partnership. 61 P.3d at 987, citing 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 359 (1987) and 56
A.L.R.3d892. Of those factors, "the most important [are] the source ofthepremiums, and
the beneficiary designated." 56 A.L.R.3d 892, 895 (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding the foregoing principals of law and this Court's adoption of the
factualfindingthat the Partnership paid the Policy premiums, the trial court determined not
to award the proceeds to the Partnership. It did so even as it acknowledged that the Policy
named Parduhn as beneficiary and that the Partnership paid the premiums. It rejected those
factors as not worthy of consideration, however:
The Supreme Court noted that the partnership paid the
premiums and that was a factor in determining the equity ofthe
situation. It is a factor that seemingly favors distribution to
the partnership. The Supreme Court also stated that the named
beneficiary is a factor in determining who is equitably entitled
to the proceeds. Of course what makes this case difficult,
among other things, is that here the partnership paid the
premiums but Parduhn was the named beneficiary. Whatever
guidance this court can takefrom[these factors] is thus diluted
as those factors are opposed to each other and lead to different
"equities."
R. 1901.
To solve the apparent conundrum, the court turned to the very document this Court
had akeady rejected as a basis to award the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs: the Buy-Sell
Agreement.
The court found that the Buy Sell Agreement "provide[d] guidance in deciding Buchi
and Parduhn's intent when they obtained their policies." R. 1902. The court may be correct
in finding guidance in the Buy Sell Agreement; it certainly erred in interpreting that
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guidance. To the court, the Buy Sell Agreement indicated that Buchi and Parduhn must have
intended the heirs of a deceased partner to get the entire proceeds of any insurance policy.
This is not an error of fact, as again, no fact exists to support the conclusion the court draws
from the Buy Sell Agreement. Rather, it is an error of interpretation, an error of law. As
such, it is entitled to no deference by this Court. Parduhn, 61 P.3d at 984 \5.
One cannot find an intent to have the full amount of the 1989 policies included in the
Buy Sell Agreement as it stood at Brad Buchi's death. The Buy Sell Agreement, following
the 1984 amendment, contained clear direction that directly contradicts the court's
interpretation:
"The Buy-Sell insurance will be $100,000. In the event of a
death of either partner, the remaining partner shall pay
$100,000 to the survivors of the deceased with the proceeds of
the $100,000 insurance policy which each own on each other."
The Buy Sell Agreement does not say "the Buy-Sell insurance will be $300,000." It does
not say "the remaining partner shall pay all the proceeds to the survivors of the deceased."18
Whatever the partners might have done, or might have thought about doing, they did not
amend the Buy Sell Agreement again after 1984. Clearly, Buchi and Parduhn knew how to
amend the Buy-Sell Agreement, as they had done just that in 1984 when they first increased
the amount of life insurance they carried on each other. Pltf. Ex. 2. Just as clearly, they did
not do so again in 1989, nor in the following eight years until Buchi's death. The mere fact
18

Interestingly, prior to 1984, the Buy Sell Agreement provided "Both partners are
insured for $20,000 and all of which will go to the deceased persons wife or survivors."
Pltf.. Ex. 1.
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that Buchi might have considered doing so in 1990 (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 3), does not
support a finding that he "clearly" intended 100% of the proceeds to go to his heirs,
especially in light of other evidence (Lissa's divorce suit, filed Sept 1990 (Tr. 109-110); his
purchase of other insurance for his family at the same time (Tr. at 117-118)).
Yet, the court held that "[i]f they [Buchi and Parduhn] intended the surviving partner
to retain any portion of the proceeds, the court believes that such a provision could have and
would have been provided to show such intent." R. 1902. Neither logic nor the evidence
the court had before it supports this reasoning. First, Parduhn testified as to his intent. He
stated that he never intended the family of Buchi to get more than the $ 100,000 stated in the
face of the Buy Sell Agreement. Tr. at 27. He testified that he and Brad Buchi did not
amend the Buy Sell Agreement at the time or after they bought the Policy in 1989, and never
discussed amending it. Id. Brad Buchi, of course, could not testify to his intent.19
Moreover, uncontradicted testimony established that at about the same time that Buchi and
Parduhn took out the Policy and the similar policy insuring Parduhn's life, Buchi also
purchased additional insurance on his life that named his then wife Lissa and his children as

19

Lissa Buchi, Brad Buchi's wife in 1984 and 1989 did testify that she intended the
entire Policy proceeds to be paid to the heirs of the deceased partner. Tr. at 100-101. She
also testified that the divorce court ordered Brad to keep the $300,000 Policy in force. Tr.
at 105-106. On cross examination by Parduhn's counsel, however, she corrected herself,
stating that the policy the court ordered Brad to maintain was a different policy that named
her as beneficiary. Tr. at 113, Pltf. Ex. 5; Tr. at 120, Pltf. Ex. 21. At the time of Brad's
death, three of their five children werefinanciallydependent on him. Tr. at 105-107. This
testimony is at odds with Parduhn's proffer, discussed below. She also testified that in the
conversations with Glade Parduhn, no discussion about the Policy proceeds going to him
came up. Tr. at 108.
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beneficiaries. Tr. at 104,188, 120-121, Pltf.. Ex. 5 & 21. Sheldon Hanson, the insurance
agent who wrote the 1984 policies as well as the 1989 policies and other life insurance
policies Brad Buchi purchased to benefit his family directly, testified that Buchi intended to
have insurance both for his family and for his partner:
13
Q. So, the buy/sell insurance was aside from some
14 addition substantial amount of insurance he [Buchi] had
acquired in
15 some other fashion, correct?
16
A. That's correct.
17
Q. Is it very common in your practice and in your
18 experience for a person to want to have a policy such as the
19 policy that Brad Buchi purchased for Lisa and the children in
20 addition to the benefits that they would be entitled to under a
21 buy/sell agreement-type policy?
22
A. Yes, I think that was Brad's intent, that they had
23 their own individual coverage — I am sorry, a coverage on
him
24 for their specific direct benefit, coverage on him for the
25 benefit of the partner.
Tr. at 148 (emphasis added).
Given the testimony of Parduhn and Sheldon Hanson, and the clear language of the
1989 Buy Sell Agreement, one can only conclude that if the partners intended the survivors
ofthe deceasedpartnerto get more than the $100,000 specified in the Buy Sell Agreement,
such a provision could have and would have been provided to show such intent. It was not,
and the court committed error in reading such an amendment into the document. 4447
Associates, 973 P.2d at 997 f 18. This error is reversible, because the court relied solely on
this non existent "intent" in awarding the entire proceeds to the Buchi Heirs.
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Because the facts do not support the award to the Buchi Heirs, the decision must be
reversed. Bellon, 808 P.2d at 1094.
C. The Equities Favor Distribution of the Proceeds to the
Partnership.
In addition to the legal presumption that the Partnership should receive the proceeds
because it paid for, and thus owned the Policy, die equities also favor distribution of die
proceeds to the Partnership. The court's ruling, however, utterly failed to take into account
the equities favoring distribution to the Partnership, and the lack of equities favoring
distribution to the Buchi Heirs. No other party has or could establish a stronger equitable
claim to the proceeds.
This case originally involved a $300,000 life insurance policy, a terminated Buy-Sell
Agreement that never addressed anything other than the first $ 100,000 of insurance, and two
competing camps of claimants - die decedent's former partner, and his family members.
This Court has already rejected the claims of Parduhn and the Buchi Heirs. 61 P.3d at 986
^[15 and ^[16. This Court rejected those claims even in the face of dictum by the district court
that it would have awarded the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs in equity. R. 1456-57.20 On
remand, the court again awarded the proceeds to die Buchi Heirs, this time citing the family
20

That dictum, based on an assumption that the Buchi Heirs had an insurable interest
is irrelevant to the decision on remand, because 31A-21-104(5) requires analysis without
regard to insurable interest or consent. In any event, having an insurable interest would not
make the Buchi Heirs beneficiaries of the Policy. Insurance law is clear that on a legal basis
at least, only a named beneficiary has arightto policy proceeds. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. v.
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519,522 (Utah 1993), citing Browning v. Equitable LifeAssur. Soc., 80 P.2d
348, 352 (1938).
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relationship and the Buy Sell Agreement. When stripped of the court's unfounded reliance
on a non-existent intent in the now terminated Buy Sell Agreement, however, the court's
award to the Buchi Heirs rests solely on the familial relationship. See R. 1903 ("When
considering the equitable claims of the other potential universe of claimants, including that
of a long-term business partner, the court finds in favor of the family"). The family
relationship alone, however, cannot support the award to the Buchi Heirs in equity, as it
ignores the reality of the relationships between Brad Buchi and the defendants as well as the
claims of Glade Parduhn and University Texaco.
1. Equity Does Not Support Distribution of the
Proceeds to The Buchi Heirs.
The trial did not include any evidence on the nature of the relationship between Brad
Buchi and any of the Buchi Heirs. The record does not disclose whether the Buchi Children
were estrangedfromor on good terms with Brad Buchi, or whether they had at his death any
economic interest in his life.21 Nor did the trial deal with the quality of the relationship
between Joanne Buchi and Brad Buchi, although the evidence did show that she had sued
him for a divorce. R. 151. Thus the record does not support the award to the Buchi Heirs
in equity. Nor did the Buchi Heirs proffer any new facts on remand that would support
distribution to themselves in equity.

21

Interestingly, none of the Buchi Children testified at trial. The trial contained no
evidence of the relationship between Brad Buchi and his children, other than Lissa Buchi's
statement that the children were dependent on him for child support and some even lived
with him. Tr. at 108.
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In fact, had the court considered all the circumstances, and sought to reach a result
that would be equitable for all concerned, he would have considered the proffers by Parduhn
and University Texaco. Although no evidence came in at trial about the quality of the
relationships between Brad Buchi and his children, counsel for Parduhn proffered evidence
at trial that would have shown that the children no longer had an economic interest in
Buchi's life at the time of his death. See Tr. at 128-129. Parduhn's counsel attempted to
introduce through Lissa Buchi evidence that Brad Buchi had actually satisfied fully his child
care obligations prior to his death, but the court upheld an objection to the line of
questioning. Tr. at 123. Subsequently, Mr. Fishburn proffered that shortly before the
dissolution of the Partnership, Buchi paid off his entire remaining child support obligations
by giving his ex-wife a lien on Partnership property. When the Partnership sold the service
stations to Blackett Oil, Lissa Buchi liquidated her lien and collected the full amount of
Buchi's remaining child support obligations from the proceeds of the sale. Tr. at 128-129.
In addition, Lissa Buchi testified that she was the primary beneficiary another $250,000
insurance on Brad Buchi's life, as well as some term insurance. Tr. at 104,116. Plaintiff's
Exhibit 21, received into evidence at Tr. 120, showed that the Buchi Children received
directly by assignment a $100,000 policy on Brad's life.
This proffer and evidence should have at least put the court on notice that it could not
award the proceeds to the Buchi Children without taking additional evidence. Buchi had
provided amply for his children's support through other sources, negating any need for the
court to search for an intent to have them receive fully half the entire Policy proceeds as
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well.
The trial record also contained enough evidence about Joanne and Brad Buchi's
relationship to indicate to the court that the mere fact that Joanne was "legally married" to
Brad Buchi did not mean she had a right - legally or in equity - to the proceeds of his life
insurance. Utah Code Ann §31A-21-104, as interpreted by this court in the first appeal of
this case, requires that a person have an insurable interest both at the time an insurance
policy is purchased, and throughout the term of that policy, up to and including the death of
the insured. 61 P.3d at 986,1(16.
Joanne Buchi was not married to Brad Buchi when the insurance was procured. No
one disputed that Joanne and Brad Buchi were separated and in the process of a divorce at
the time of his death. Tr. at 151. The record contains no evidence of a warm and loving
relationship between Brad and Joanne such that one could assume he intended Joanne to
receive a portion of the proceeds. Thus, the record does not establish that Joanne Buchi had
an insurable interest in Brad's life. 4447 Associates, 973 P.2d at 997.
Moreover, the record reveals not one iota of evidence that would tend to support an
award of the proceeds to Joanne Buchi individually on any other basis. What evidence does
exist tends to show that she should not get any of the proceeds in equity. "In any equitable
proceeding, the fundamental rule is that he who seeks equity must do equity." Tuttle v.
Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 1981). Joanne cannot meet this test.
Joanne Buchi is the personal representative of Brad Buchi's estate, and she appeared
in this case as such. R.275. She did not argue for an award to the estate in equity however;
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to the contrary, she argued only that the proceeds should go to her individually in a nontestamentary transfer. R. 1862. Her failure to articulate a position of the estate on remand,
where the court had instructions to award the proceeds to the person(s) entitled to them in
equity, cannot be overlooked in determining her own individual right to the proceeds in
equity.22
As the record now stands, no basis exists on which this Court can uphold the award
of half the proceeds to Joanne Buchi or the Buchi Children in equity. The court should
reverse the decision of the trial court and order Joanne Buchi to pay to University Texaco
the proceeds she received from the court. If necessary, the Court should impose a
constructive trust with Joanne Buchi as the trustee for University Texaco and impose a lien
against her home. At a minimum, this Court should reverse the award as it applies to the
Buchi Heirs, and order the trial court to take additional evidence on the actual relationship
between Brad Buchi and his children as well as on the marital situation of Joanne and Brad
Buchi and her actions as personal representative of the estate of Brad Buchi, to determine
whether they have any claim in equity to the proceeds.
2. Equity Requires an Award of the Proceeds to the
Partnership.
Equity favors distribution of the proceeds to the Partnership. Only through judgment
for the Partnership can the court "achieve a proper balance of conflicting interests" and
22

A review of the pleadings filed in the Buchi Estate shows five claimants, other than
Parduhn and University Texaco, made claims against the estate, totaling over $50,000. See
Appendix, Tab 7. These claims were not introduced below.
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provide

"equal treatment

of

all

concerned."

Merriam Webster On-Line,

www.merriamwebsteronline.com. The court's award to the Buchi Heirs was not based in
impartiality, justice or fairness; it was not equitable. Neither the Buchi Heirs, nor any other
potential claimant had any expectation in fact, law or equity of receiving the entire proceeds.
Surely, Brad Buchi and Glade Parduhn did not intend the Buy Sell Agreement to provide a
windfall to either the insured's partner or his survivors.23 Giving the award to the Buchi
Heirs may have benefitted them, but it left out all other claimants and failed to achieve any
kind of balance between conflicting claims.
Although the Buchi Heirs and Glade Parduhn were the only claimants below, they
were not the only persons with an economic interest in the partnership or Brad Buchi's life.
Others include creditors of the Partnership and creditors of the estate of Brad Buchi.
Certainly, Buchi's long term business partner also had an interest.24 The award to the Buchi
Heirs entirely ignores the interests and equities of these other potential claimants, even
though those interests were raised in argument. See e.g., Hr'g Tr. at 17-21; 43-47; 56-58;
R. 1665-1672; 1735-1749; 1877-1881.
Distribution of the Policy proceeds to the Partnership will ensure that not only the

23

Buy sell insurance simply provides the funds for one partner to buy out the other in
the event of death; it should not replace other insurance on the lives of the partners, and did
not do so here. See e.g., Tr. at 104, 118 and Pltf. Ex. 21.
24

Parduhn's economic interest in Buchi's life did not end with the dissolution of the
Partnership. Parduhn asserted claims of conversion of partnership assets below, which
remain unresolved, as the court bifurcated those issuesfromthe issues now on appeal. See
R. 1-8; 1272.
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claimants below, but virtually all others with an economic interest in Brad Buchi's life or
estate, will also get a portion of the proceeds. By ordering distribution of the proceeds to the
Partnership, any remaining creditors of the Partnership can be paid, and the net assets
divided between the estate of Bard Buchi and Parduhn, (after appropriate accounting and
credit for any amounts shown to have been wrongfully taken by Buchi). Joanne Buchi as
Buchi's surviving spouse, and the Buchi Children, will receive the net estate proceeds.
An award to the Partnership will satisfy the requirements of 31A-21-104(5), fit the
evidence in this case, and benefit Buchi's Heirs, as well as each other person or entity that
had a stake in Buchi's life. Greater equity could not exist.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Utah Code Ann. §31A-104(5) requires that the Court award the Policy proceeds to
a person or persons entitled to them in equity. That section also allows this Court to
establish a constructive trust, if necessary to complete the equitable distribution of the
insurance proceeds. Here, as shown above, the Court should reverse the trial court's award
of the proceeds to the Buchi Heirs as an abuse of discretion, and remand with specific
instructions to the court to distribute the proceeds to the Partnership in equity and to impose
a constructive trust, with Joanne Buchi as constructive trustee ofthe proceeds she has already
received. Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104(5). Furthermore, the Court should instruct the trial
court to declare a lien on Joanne Buchi's home for the full amount of the proceeds she
received, plus interest at the legal rate, until she pays the proceeds over to the Partnership
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and order her to remit the entire amount of the proceeds, with interest, to the Partnership
within 30 days of the order, or have judgment for the full amount due, with interest, entered
against her. In the alternative, the Court should remand with specific instructions to the trial
court to take additional evidence tailored to the specific issues before it in equity.
Respectfully Submitted,
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NANCI SNOW BOCKELIE
Attorney for Intervenor/Appellant
University Texaco
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